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Much of the empirical research on the distribution of household wealth is focused on
wealth inequality. A common question in many of those studies involves ‘top shares’ of household
wealth (Saez and Zucman 2016; Bricker et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2021). Although there is still
substantial debate about exactly how much wealth is owned by the top 1 percent, top 0.1 percent,
or the top 0.01 percent of the population, there is general agreement that household wealth is highly
skewed and has become more unequal over time. Our recent paper shows that those conclusions
about trends in top wealth shares hold even after broadening the concept of the wealth to include
the present value of private and public retirement benefits (Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming).
Another important reason to conduct empirical research with household wealth data is to
study lifecycle wealth accumulation, with a focus on the state of retirement preparedness or
‘adequacy’. Some retirement adequacy studies compare accumulated wealth to the predictions of
a lifecycle consumption smoothing model; other studies involve more straightforward questions
and calculations, such as whether the annuitized value of accumulated wealth is sufficient to
maintain pre-retirement income or consumption levels. The literature on retirement adequacy is in
many ways much less settled than the top wealth shares literature, with conclusions ranging from
‘more than half’ to ‘fewer than 20 percent’ of US families are inadequately prepared for retirement.
One common element in both wealth distribution literatures is the need for a
comprehensive measure of household wealth. The starting point for wealth is marketable assets
less liabilities, which is the concept captured in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and
estimated by the Federal Reserve Board at $96.1 trillion in the 2019 survey (Bhutta et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, comprehensive household wealth should also include the present value of defined
benefit (DB) pension claims, which adds another $19.1 trillion to household wealth in 2019. DB
wealth is not measured directly at the household level, but the aggregates can be allocated across
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the individuals in the SCF who have legal claims to those benefits (Sabelhaus and Volz 2019,
forthcoming). Finally, the aggregate net present value of all future social security benefits less
taxes (or social security wealth, SSW) for working age and retired individuals is substantial, adding
another $23.9 trillion to household wealth in 2019 (Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming).
Including DB pensions and SSW adds nearly 50 percent to marketable wealth overall, but
the distributional effect of their inclusion is uneven. DB wealth and SSW, in particular, are more
evenly distributed than the narrow concept (‘base wealth’)—marketable assets less liabilities—
captured directly in the SCF. Adding DB wealth and SSW to the SCF base wealth concept lowers
the top 1 percent and top 10 percent wealth shares substantially in the 1995 to 2019 survey waves,
by 5 and 9 percentage points, respectively (Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming). Including DB
wealth and SSW does not change the trends in top shares, however, because the increasing wealth
concentration of base wealth has not been offset by either faster growth or decreasing concentration
of DB wealth and SSW.
The comprehensive wealth concept that includes DB wealth and SSW can be measured
over the life cycle and across cohorts using the SCF in a pseudo-panel framework. As noted, the
comprehensive wealth measure does not reverse the trend in top wealth shares over time, but it
does reveal stark differences in average wealth across age groups over time (Sabelhaus and Volz,
forthcoming). A large majority of the growth in average comprehensive wealth between 1995 and
2016 occurred at older ages. Adjusting the wealth measure for expected social security funding
shortfalls makes the age differentials even larger, especially for the bottom half of the wealth
distribution. In fact, average comprehensive wealth is estimated to be lower in 2019 than it was in
1995 for younger individuals in the bottom 50 percent of their wealth distribution. These findings
motivate our approach to studying retirement adequacy.
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In this paper, we use the comprehensive wealth measures we developed for analyzing
levels and trends in wealth concentration to study retirement adequacy. As noted, however, the
issue of how to gauge the adequacy of retirement wealth is far from settled. One approach is to
compare wealth to some target based on pre-retirement living standards, as measured by income
or consumption. The simple financial advisor’s rule that you should ‘replace 70 percent of your
pre-retirement income’ is often put forth as a straw man, but researchers then go on to develop
more complicated calculations built on that same principle. An alternate approach is to compare
observed, individual wealth holdings against the predictions of a calibrated life-cycle model. Both
approaches are sensitive to assumptions. What exactly does it mean to ‘maintain’ pre-retirement
living standards? What is the appropriate utility function for a calibrated life-cycle model? What
are the appropriate time preference and other parameters in such a model? How well does either
approach capture environmental details like social insurance and income taxes?
We take an alternative approach to gauging retirement wealth adequacy to avoid these
potential pitfalls. Our cross-cohort approach to studying retirement adequacy is based on relative
wealth measures: how the wealth distribution of a cohort compares to the cohorts older than them
at the same age. The relative wealth measures do not tell us anything directly about the fraction of
a given population with or without adequate retirement wealth. Nevertheless, given a reference
point—for instance, what fraction of current retirees are suffering hardship in retirement—we can
draw conclusions about future retirees by looking at their current wealth distributions relative to
the wealth distributions of current retirees when they were observed at younger ages.
To quantify differences across cohorts, we use two approaches to compare wealth
distributions. The first approach is creating relative rank distributions that answer the question
‘where would an individual of a given cohort be if their wealth were mapped into the distribution
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of an earlier cohort?’ The second approach is percentile point comparisons, that answer the
question ‘how do the wealth holdings differ for an individual at a given percentile of the wealth
distribution across cohorts and ages?’ 1
The relative rank charts tell us about people—how many individuals, in terms of
comprehensive wealth, are ahead of or behind their counterparts in earlier cohorts at the same age.
The key messages about inequality and retirement preparedness come from seeing the entire cohort
arrayed along the relative wealth distribution. We use the term ‘relative rank gap’ to describe the
distance, in percentile points, between the two cohorts’ distributions. When a younger cohort is
ahead of an earlier cohort, the relative rank gap will be positive (so that a negative gap suggests a
shortfall). 2 Complementing that perspective, the percentile points comparison charts tell us about
dollars—cross-cohort differences in wealth at a given age for a fixed percentile of the distribution.
The focus on one percentile at a time allows us to drill down into the relevance of the various
wealth components across the wealth distribution and how they change over the life cycle and
time.
As an example, consider comparing Early Baby Boomers (1940s cohort) to the 1930s
cohort, their reference cohort, at age 60. We observe that Early Boomers’ wealth is generally on
par with or above the 1930s cohort across the full wealth distribution. That is, the relative ranks of
the 1940s cohort are all greater than the 1930s cohort ranks. As a result, when we look at the
percentile point comparisons, the 1940s cohort’s comprehensive wealth value above the 1930s
cohort’s comprehensive wealth value at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. What the
percentile point comparisons point to is the key contribution of social security to that result, that
the 1940s are ahead of 1930s, especially at the bottom of the wealth distribution where base wealth
values are lower for the 1940s cohort.

5
Our dataset spans 30 years, and thus we can also compare the 1950s cohort to the 1930s
cohort, still the reference cohort, at age 60. The relative wealth holdings of the 1950s cohort (the
‘Mid-Boomers’) at age 60 gives us the first indications of deterioration at the bottom of the wealth
distribution. The extent of the shortfall, though, depends on the wealth concept. For example, the
base concept (i.e., excluding SSW) shows a relative rank gap of between -5 and -10 for individuals
in the 1950s cohort relative to the 1930s cohort in the bottom half of the wealth distribution.
However, the comprehensive wealth measure including SSW completely reverses those gaps to
the point where the rank gap is at least two for nearly all of the bottom half of the distribution.
Looking at younger ages, there is more evidence of relative deterioration in the bottom and
middle of the wealth distribution for ‘Late Boomers’ (born in the 1960s) and ‘Gen-Xers’ (born in
the 1970s). Base wealth at the 10th and 25th percentiles of the late Boomer and Gen-X distributions
is well below the wealth of earlier cohorts observed at the same ages. In contrast, further up the
wealth distribution, there are notable, positive relative rank gaps.
Social security is an important offset to base wealth declines at the bottom of the wealth
distribution for younger cohorts. Adding SSW and estimating the comprehensive wealth
distribution reverses many of the points about relative deterioration at low wealth levels across
cohorts and ages. In that sense, social security has become relatively more important in terms of
total wealth for the bottom half of the wealth distribution for younger cohorts, with the higher
expected benefits based on lower (relative) earnings and higher (relative) life expectancy.
However, that fact that those social security benefits are not expected to be fully payable for the
youngest cohorts under current law overrides the relative improvements in retirement adequacy
coming from social security.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss how we construct our
comprehensive measure of wealth. In the third section, we review the literature on measuring
retirement adequacy and discuss how the required (and debatable) assumptions motivate our
relative wealth approach. The fourth section presents the relative rank distributions, and the fifth
shows percentile point comparisons. Section six concludes.

Data and Methods
Our approach to studying retirement adequacy requires a comprehensive, individual-level
wealth measure across birth cohorts and over the life cycle. Achieving this goal involves starting
with high-quality, household-level balance sheet data and adding in household-level estimates of
SSW and DB wealth. 3 The micro data used here are the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for
1989 through 2019. The SCF is focused on household balance sheets, and the survey also has
extensive information about incomes, demographics, and labor force experiences. 4 The SCF alone
is not ideal for calculating a comprehensive wealth measure; we bring in additional information
on earnings and relative mortality to estimate DB and SSW more precisely than would be possible
with the SCF alone. We estimate life-cycle earnings for individuals and their spouse/partners,
required since the SCF is a series of cross-section snapshots, as inputs to calculating social security
taxes and benefits over the life cycle. Since individual mortality rates are necessary to estimate
present discounted values for both SSW and DB pensions, we differentiate mortality by age, sex,
income, and birth year.
Estimating the present discounted value of retirement benefits is complicated for several
reasons. One conceptual issue is whether to use ‘expected’ versus ‘termination’ benefits
(Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming). The concept of termination value for SSW—what any given
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individual would receive if the system shut down today—is not well suited for the analysis here
because the assumptions about who would receive benefits under a terminated system have less
real-world relevance. In contrast, expected SSW is the present discounted value of total benefits
less future taxes, conditioned on the individual working and paying taxes through a given expected
retirement age (as captured in the survey) and receiving benefits as soon as possible (age 62 or the
first year after labor force exit, whichever is later). The labor force and earnings history along with
expectations data in the SCF are used in conjunction with typical life-cycle earnings patterns
derived from linked longitudinal survey and administrative data in the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). The detailed assumptions needed to create the required inputs for computing
expected SSW in the SCF are discussed in earlier papers (Sabelhaus 2019; Sabelhaus and Volz,
forthcoming).
The measure of DB wealth consistent with the household balance sheet is the present value
of future DB benefits, which is equivalent to the value of the financial assets held now that will be
liquidated over time to pay the promised stream of DB benefits when those liabilities come due.
The SCF collects details about DB pension benefits in three different survey modules. The three
categories cover: (1) DB benefits already being received, (2) DB benefits associated with a past
job where the known benefit amount will be received at a specific future date, and (3) DB benefits
associated with a current job, where the ultimate benefit will depend on how much longer the
worker is covered by the plan and their final salary.
For currently received benefits and reported expected benefits from past job pensions, the
respondent is asked how much is currently being received or how much will be received when the
benefit begins. These benefit payments are the primary input to a present discounted value
calculation that also involves an assumed interest rate and demographically differentiated mortality
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rates (described below). This present discounted value calculation is equivalent to the level of
financial assets that the retirement plan sponsor must hold to pay those promised benefits, and thus
corresponds directly to the base household wealth measure captured in the survey.
Calculating DB pension wealth for workers covered by a plan on their current job is more
complicated, because the benefit that will be received in the future is unknown as of the survey
date. The aggregate measure of DB wealth that corresponds to our comprehensive household
wealth is the financial liability of retirement plan sponsors; it corresponds to only the DB wealth
that the worker has accumulated to date. Plan sponsors are required to hold only the present value
of benefits already earned by the worker, the termination value, or accrued benefit obligation. The
termination value represents the worker’s legal claim to DB wealth, because that level of assets is
equivalent to the present value of benefits they will receive if their plan coverage ended today.
The core demographics in the SCF—age, sex, and income—are key inputs to the
differential mortality adjustment, which is key for estimating present values for retirement income
streams. 5 Constructing the present value of social security and DB pension incomes requires
survival probabilities, which are computed for each SCF respondent and their spouse/partner, if
present, through age 99. The starting point is Social Security Administration (SSA) cohort
mortality by age and sex. These are modified by a differential mortality adjustment by income
percentile within groups defined by age and sex based on Chetty et al. (2016). Chetty et al. (2016)
map SSA death records onto income tax records to study mortality differences across the income
distribution, which we transform into a differential adjustment (for methodological detail, see the
appendix to Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming).

How Do We Know If Retirement Wealth Is ‘Adequate’?

9
Financial advisors have long advocated a ‘replacement rate’ approach to retirement
planning. A standard rule of thumb is that individuals should be able to replace approximately 70
percent of their pre-retirement income through their retirement years. The 70 percent rule is an
average, and good financial advisors are quick to note that differences in individual circumstances
will move the target up or down. Heterogeneity in circumstances is also a recognized key in the
academic literature on retirement adequacy.
The question of retirement adequacy is far from resolved. One evaluation of retirement
adequacy creates an index based on the SCF to estimate what fraction of the population is predicted
to have enough resources (both wealth and income) at age 65 to maintain their pre-retirement
standard of living, as measured by consumption (Munnell et al. 2021). The authors find that about
half of current US households will fall more than 10 percent short of reaching their target, up from
about a third of households in the 1980s. The model underlying the index is very complex, with
income replacement targets that vary by factors such as housing tenure and effective income tax
rates. However, key assumptions on inputs, such as consumption levels during retirement, are not
consistent with observed age-spending patterns, and that biases absolute adequacy measures
towards shortfalls (Hurd and Rohwedder 2012).
Comparing actual wealth from a survey such as the SCF to predicted ‘optimal’ wealth from
a calibrated life-cycle model is an alternative way to measure retirement adequacy (e.g., Engen et
al. 1999). Rather than ask what level of wealth is needed to meet a given target replacement rate,
this approach defines ‘adequate’ as enough wealth to smooth the predicted marginal utility of
consumption over the life cycle. Relatively simple life-cycle models can provide a wide range of
predictions about optimal life-cycle wealth, depending on assumed inputs such as time discount
factors, earnings paths, mortality, and even the arguments in the utility function. A lack of
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heterogeneity in structural model inputs leads to predictions that average across observations, and
a larger fraction of the population will far short of those average targets.
Studies defining ‘optimal’ wealth using structural life-cycle models that capture more
heterogeneity across the population generally seem to suggest that fewer US families have
inadequate retirement saving. One such study, using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
makes use of detailed earnings histories and demographic characteristics and, thus, is able to fine
tune life-cycle model predictions to specific types of households (Love et al. 2008). They find that
only 18 percent of households in 2006 would fall short of maintaining income at more than 150
percent of poverty over their remaining lifetimes.
Another, even more finely tuned, comparison of actual and optimal wealth solves a
different life-cycle optimization problem for every household in the HRS based on their unique
characteristics (Scholz et al. 2006). They find that fewer than 20 percent of households are saving
below their optimal target, and the shortfalls of those who are under saving are generally small.
The predicted wealth from any structural life-cycle model still depends on exactly which
circumstances (or ‘state’ variables) are included in the model, and computational constraints limit
which characteristics can be included. Furthermore, structural models are inherently static in
nature and cannot capture how circumstances might be evolving for future populations.
Dynamic microsimulation is another approach to capturing heterogeneity and does not
suffer from the computational limits nor the static nature of structural life-cycle models. A dynamic
microsimulation uses stochastic transition equations to age a population forward through time,
simulating the wide range of outcomes that will be experienced. One such study projected future
earnings and retirement incomes for the Baby Boom generation and found that typical outcomes
should continue to improve for the Baby Boom generation relative to their parents, but changing
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demographic and earnings patterns are leaving more individuals economically vulnerable (Butrica
et al. 2007). The dynamic microsimulation draws attention to retirement wealth adequacy for
specific groups whose circumstances are changing over time: divorced women, never married
men, Hispanics, high school dropouts, those with weak labor force attachment, and those with the
lowest lifetime earnings.
Another recent paper looking at future retirement outcomes captures heterogeneity and
many of the benefits of dynamic microsimulation with a reduced-form, empirical approach (Brown
et al. 2020). Their approach avoids lots of assumptions, and their findings further motivate our
approach to studying retirement adequacy. The authors use early waves of the HRS, for whom
economic and demographic characteristics are observed just before and through retirement, to
assess which characteristics of pre-retirees are useful for predicting economic hardship during
retirement. They use those correlations to predict how the cohorts approaching retirement today
will fare in their retirement years. They find that those approaching retirement, particularly men,
are indeed more likely to experience economic hardship, on average. Comparing cohorts at
younger ages to help predict future outcomes is similar in spirit to what we do here. That is, what
can we say about the likely outcomes for a cohort of pre-retirees by looking at a currently retired
group when the current retirees were younger?
In sum, the wide range of opinion in the literature about how to map observed wealth into
measures of retirement adequacy leads to a wide range of conclusions about how well US
households are prepared for retirement. One can look at the same individuals and arrive at very
different conclusions about their retirement wealth adequacy. Indeed, the uncertainty about
assumptions needed to create such ‘absolute’ measures of retirement wealth adequacy directly
motivates the alternative approach we use in this paper. Our investigation focuses on how the
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wealth of younger cohorts compare to current retirees (or near-retirees) when they were at the same
age in some earlier year.
Thus, rather than ask whether a given family or individual has ‘sufficient’ wealth for a
secure retirement, we create relative adequacy measures by looking across cohorts at various ages.
We introduce two ways to characterize relative wealth distributions, which answer the following
questions. First, ‘where would the individuals at a specific rank in the wealth distribution of a
given cohort be if their wealth is mapped into the distribution of an earlier cohort observed at the
same age?’ We call this the relative rank distribution. The interpretations are all about counts of
individuals. For example, if the relative rank distribution for a comparison cohort lies always at or
above the reference cohort, we can say the comparison cohort is just as well or better off than the
reference cohort at every point in the wealth distribution.
The second measure answers the question ‘what wealth do individuals hold at a given
percentile of the wealth distribution across cohorts and ages?’ We call these charts percentile point
comparisons. The percentile points comparison charts focus on a single slice of the wealth
distribution across cohort and age, instead of characterizing the entire distribution like the relative
rank charts. Another way to think of this is that the relative rank charts show us counts of people
at points in the wealth distribution, while the percentile point comparisons are about dollar gaps
for the people at one of those points. Though we can only focus on one wealth percentile at a time
in a percentile point comparison, the data disentangle the contributions of different wealth sources
across the distribution.

Relative Rank Distributions
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We refer to relative rank distributions as the first approach we use to look at relative wealth
distributions. . Our charts answer the question ‘what wealth rank would individuals of one cohort
represent, if their wealth were mapped into the distribution of an earlier cohort?’ The comparisons
presented are specific to an age group and a wealth concept, so there are several permutations such
relative rank calculations.
We limit the number of comparisons by working with two wealth concepts across three
age groups. As our base wealth measure, we use SCF net worth plus DB benefits, while
comprehensive wealth—the base wealth measure plus SSW—is the alternative. The three age
groups are ‘40’ (age 38-42), ‘50’ (age 48-52), and ‘60’ (age 58-62), with reference cohorts 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s, respectively, for these age groups. Given the SCF time span, the age 60 relative
rank comparisons (for example) use the 1930s as the reference cohort, and the 1940s and 1950s
cohorts as the two comparison groups. 6 The age 50 and age 40 relative ranks shift the reference
and comparison cohorts forward one and two decades, respectively.
The goal of the relative rank and percentile point comparisons is to avoid making absolute
statements about what ‘adequate’ retirement wealth means, though the approach does require an
assumption about what it means for wealth levels to be ‘comparable’ across cohorts. The reference
and comparison cohorts are either 10 or 20 years apart in time, so comparing nominal wealth is
misleading. To convert wealth to real dollars, the inflation adjustment uses the data series used to
calculate and inflation-adjust social security benefits (the CPI).
The relative rank distributions plot the comparison cohort percentiles on the x-axis, and the
reference cohort cumulative percentiles on the y-axis. The graphs all include a 45-degree line that
plots the reference cohort cumulative wealth against their own wealth distribution. Thus, the 45degree line (trivially) shows that one percent of the reference cohort population is in each
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percentile of the reference cohort wealth distribution. However, that 45-degree line is a useful
benchmark for the comparison cohorts, because if the comparison cohort relative rank distribution
falls along the 45-degree line, the comparison cohort can be said to have the same wealth
distribution as the reference cohort. If the relative rank distribution were above the 45-degree line,
the comparison cohort wealth is above reference cohort wealth at that percentile.
With those chart-reading principles in mind, the first relative rank distribution in Figure 1a
uses the base wealth concept (i.e., SCF net worth plus DB wealth) at age 60. The reference cohort
for age 60 is the 1930s. The grey lines show the relative rank distributions for the 1940s (loosely,
Early Boomer) cohort, and the dashed lines show the relative rank distributions for the 1950s
(loosely, Mid-Boomer). The relative rank distributions for the 1940s cohort are on or above the
45-degree line. That means everyone in the 1940s cohort had the same or more wealth than their
counterpart at the same point in the wealth distribution in the 1930s cohort at the same percentile.
The horizontal distance between the relative rank and 45-degree lines measures the relative rank
gap. For example, an individual around the 55th percentile of the 1940s cohort had the same wealth
as an individual at the 70th percentile of the reference cohort, for a relative rank gap of 15. In the
bottom 30 percent of the distribution, the relative rank gap was never above five. But the rank gap
grew to about 10 at the median, reaching the highest value at the 70th percentile. The relative rank
distributions only show people, not dollars. Accordingly one cannot compare differences in the
dollar amounts that correspond to the relative rank gaps, which we discuss that in the next section.
Figure 1 here
Although the relative rank distributions show an unambiguous improvement between the
age 60 1930s and 1940s wealth distributions, the story is different for the 1950s cohort. The latter
group tracks the first few percentiles of the 1930s cohort, but then it falls behind by a few rank
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points for much of the distribution. Around 45 percent of the 1950s cohort had less wealth than
their counterparts in the 1930s group. The fact that the relative rank gap is positive for the 1950s
cohort at higher percentiles is consistent with what we know about rising wealth inequality over
time. Again, all we can say is that an individual in the 1950s cohort at (say) the 25th percentile of
the wealth distribution hadthe same wealth as someone in the 1930s at the 20th percentile, which
seems like a modest gap.
Adding expected SSW to the base wealth concept pushes the 1940s cohort even further
above the 1930s, and it also improves the relative ranks for the 1950s cohort (Figure 1b). 7 The
relative rank gap for the 1940s was above 10 for the 30th percentile of the reference cohort
distribution, and the relative rank gaps were now all positive for the 1950s cohort. One way to
interpret this shift in relative ranks is that social security was relatively more important for the
1940s and 1950s cohorts than it was for the 1930s reference cohort. Our approach to estimate SSW
in the micro data captures the fact that changing demographics and lifetime wages produced
differences in SSW for individuals at the same point in the wealth distribution across cohorts
(Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming). If average individuals in the comparison cohort at a given age
and wealth percentile had a longer life expectancy, they would be allocated more SSW. Changes
in social security replacement rates, marriage patterns, relative earnings between spouses (through
spousal and survivor benefits), and labor force participation also matter, but the relative ranks show
that, on net, SSW was relatively more important for the younger cohorts.
Shifting back to the base wealth concept and looking earlier in the life cycle, the relative
ranks at age 50 show that some of the 1950s cohort trailed the Early Boomer counterparts at low
to modest wealth levels (Figure 2a). By contrast, the 1960s cohort trailed Early Boomers by a wide
margin, approximately 10 rank points over much of the distribution. Individuals in the 20th -25th
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percentiles of the 1960s cohort had only as much wealth as those between the 12th and the 15th
percentile of the 1940s wealth distribution. The highest wealth individuals in both the 1950s and
1960s cohorts caught up to and surpassed their counterparts in the reference cohort, again
consistent with rising wealth inequality over time. Yet, more of the 1950s cohort was relatively
higher than the reference cohort, than was the 1960s cohort.
Figure 2 here
Adding SSW to the base wealth concept notably changes the relative rank gaps at age 50
(Figure 2b). Since both the reference cohort and the comparison cohort wealth distribution
included SSW, the relative rank lines shift if social security is relatively more important for the
comparison cohorts at a given wealth percentile. In this case, the relative ranks for the 1950s and
1960s comparison cohorts using the comprehensive wealth concept implied relative improvement,
compared to the base concept shown above (Figure 2a), as the 1950s now were ahead of the 1940s
cohort and the relative rank gaps for the 1960s were notably smaller. For the 1960s cohort, there
was a modest deterioration in retirement preparation using this framework (a relative rank gap of
a few points at most), though the wedge appears for most of the wealth distribution.
As noted in the introduction, our interest in relative wealth adequacy across cohorts at
various ages is partly motivated by the observation that average wealth at younger ages has fallen
over time, which is another way of saying that a disproportionate share of the wealth gains
accumulated to older age groups (Sabelhaus and Volz, forthcoming). Our approach allows us to
consider these wealth declines at younger ages along two additional dimensions: where people fell
in the wealth distribution, and for which cohorts wealth fell. The relative rank distributions for
base wealth at age 40 confirm relative wealth declines at low wealth levels for the 1970s cohort,
but there was little difference between the 1950s and 1960s cohort at low wealth levels (Figure
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3a). It is worth noting here that a significant portion of the age 40 base wealth distribution was
close to zero, with the 25th percentile of the reference cohort having around $25,000. This point
becomes clearer when we focus on the low wealth percentiles in the percentile point comparison
charts. Further up the distribution, the 1960s cohort did relatively better than the 1950s cohort,
with a rank gap around 10 between the 60th and 80th percentiles of the reference cohort.
Figure 3 here
Social security was shown to be relatively important for relative rank distributions at age
50, which also held at age 40, such that the bottom quarter of the distribution for both the 1960s
and 1970s cohorts had positive rank gaps (Figure 3b). It is particularly notable that including SSW
closed the relative rank gaps across the whole wealth distribution for the 1970s cohort. Using a
comprehensive wealth measure that includes scheduled SSW—payable or not—the 1960s and
1970s cohorts were slightly above the 1950s cohort.
Tying together the relative rank distributions at various ages using the most comprehensive
wealth measure (Figures 1b, 2b, and 3b), one can assert that (1) the 1950s cohort tracked or was
slightly behind the 1930s cohort at age 60; (2) the 1970s cohort tracked or was slightly behind the
1950s cohort at age 40; and thus, if the relative ranks are transitive across time, (3) the 1970s
cohort was somewhere between tracking and slightly behind the 1930s cohort.
The optimistic conclusions from the relative ranks at age 40 are contingent on whether the
increasing SSW offsets relative declines in other types of wealth are in fact payable. Our
assumption used to estimate payable benefits is simple: we adopt the SSA actuaries’ projection
that 78 percent of benefits are payable after 2033. Thus, payable SSW is the present value of
scheduled benefits through 2033 plus 78 percent of scheduled benefits after. The timing is such
that the youngest cohorts will face the largest lifetime cuts, and this result comes through in the
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relative rank distributions. When we compute relative ranks at age 40 using only payable SSW,
there is more evidence of relative shortfalls for the 1960s and 1970s cohorts across much of the
wealth distribution. The 1950s reference cohort will also face benefit cuts in the payable scenario,
albeit proportionally less. The largest decrease in the rank gap for the 1960s cohort is around the
25th percentile of the reference distribution, while the 1970s cohort now experiences notable rank
gaps across the bottom two-thirds of the distribution (see Figure 3c). To evaluate how relative
wealth declines under the payable benefits scenario, we examine this question next.

Percentile Point Comparisons
Cross-cohort shifts in relative rank positions are useful because they help us compare an
entire cohort group relative to another. The shortcoming is that we cannot assess how large any
shortfalls are because the charts are ordinal in nature. Accordingly, we next present percentile
point comparisons to answer the question, ‘what is the wealth level for the individual at a given
percentile in wealth distributions across cohorts and ages?’
The percentile points comparison charts focus on a single slice of the wealth distribution
across cohort and age groups. In addition to attaching dollars to the relative rank gaps, another
advantage of this approach is being able to stack and disentangle the contribution of different
wealth sources at various percentiles of the wealth distribution. Building on the relative rank charts
in the previous section, we are particularly focused on three wealth components: SCF net worth
plus DB, payable SSW, and scheduled but not payable SSW.
The percentile points comparison charts require a choice. Although it is obvious what it
means to be at a given percentile for a given wealth concept, comparing multiple wealth
components at a given percentile requires a decision about how to ‘stack’ wealth measures to show
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the dollar contribution of each wealth component. One could, in principle, identify individuals at
a given percentile of the base wealth concept and then add average payable SSW and average
scheduled but not payable SSW. The results are comparable across these two approaches but show
slightly lower average base wealth compared to if one were to rank individuals by comprehensive
wealth instead and calculate the components.
To build the percentile points charts, we start with comprehensive wealth (SCF net worth
plus DB and scheduled SSW) for a given percentile-cohort-age combination and solve for the 10th
percentile of that wealth measure. We then repeat the process for the other two measures: SCF net
worth plus DB and payable SSW and the base wealth measure. The 10th percentile of SCF net
worth plus DB and payable SSW is then solved for as the difference between the first two values,
and the 10th percentile of SCF net worth plus DB is the difference between the second and third
values.
We begin the percentile comparisons near the bottom of the wealth distribution, at the 10th
percentile (Figure 4). The differences in overall bar heights within a given age and cohort
comparison are dollar-valued analogous to the relative rank gaps at the 10th percentile using the
comprehensive wealth measure. The fact that overall bar heights are generally similar is the
parallel to the fact that the relative ranks were generally close to the 45-degree line; that is, the
relative rank gaps were near zero, at the 10th percentile in the comprehensive wealth charts. One
exception—the 1940s cohort at age 60 had more wealth at the 10th percentile than did the 1930s
cohort—is analogous to the observation that the 1940s relative rank line was above the 45-degree
line at low wealth levels (Figure 1b). The other standout feature of the 10th percentile point
comparison is the role of SSW, first in overall dominance at every age, and second in terms of the
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importance of payable versus scheduled benefits at younger ages. The relative wealth of the 1970s
cohort was dramatically lower than predecessor cohorts based on payable benefits alone.
Figure 4 here
At the 25th percentile of the wealth distribution, base wealth plays a slightly more important
role in household resources, but social security still dominates (Figure 5). The relative deterioration
in comparison cohorts’ base wealth at the 25th percentile is notable for the 1970s cohort at age 40,
the 1960s cohort at age 50, and the 1950s cohort at age 60. These shortfalls reflect the relative rank
gaps of around -10 for the base wealth concept (Figures 1a, 2a, and 3a) at the 25th percentile. In
contrast, the 1940s cohort at age 60 had higher base wealth. As with the 10th percentile, SSW
reverses some of the relative wealth decline at the 25th percentile, but focusing on payable benefits
alone, the prospects for low wealth individuals in the 1960s and 1970s cohorts are bleaker.
Figure 5 here
The contributions to total wealth from social security and non-social security sources are
more balanced in the middle of the wealth distribution (Figure 6). Similar observations about
relative declines in base wealth present at the 25th percentile also show up at the 50th percentile,
but now only for the 1970s cohort at age 40 and the 1960s cohort at age 50, analogous to the
negative relative rank gaps near the middle of the wealth distribution in those two instances. At
the median, the 1950s cohort is comparable to the reference cohort at age 60. Nevertheless, the
relative changes are more muted or are a relative improvement over the reference cohort using the
comprehensive wealth measure, consistent with nearly all relative ranks above the 45-degree line
at the 50th percentile (Figures 1b, 2b, and 3b). In general, the 50th percentile comprehensive wealth
measures show less relative deterioration across cohorts when compared to lower wealth levels.
Figure 6 here
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Retirement adequacy is about more than wealth levels, even in our relative wealth
framework. Although it is possible that relative wealth would decline across cohorts at a given age
in the top half of the wealth distribution, the data suggest that there is in fact less to worry about
at the 75th percentile (Figure 7). In all cases, the data show gains in relative comprehensive wealth
at the 75th percentile, although focusing on only payable SSW leads to some small relative
shortfalls. Relative to the bottom half of the wealth distribution, social security is much less
important for overall wealth in the top half of the wealth distribution. An important corollary to
that statement, at least compared to the bottom half of the wealth distribution, is that social security
solvency is a relatively less important determinant of the prospects for currently young, higher
wealth individuals.
Figure 7 here
For a complete presentation of the wealth distribution, we also show wealth components at
the 90th percentiles (Figure 8). Here there are few concerns for retirement adequacy: the impression
is the mirror image of the 10th percentile charts, in which SSW dominates. At the 90th percentile,
social security is a relatively small component of comprehensive wealth, and the issue whether
social security is payable or not has very modest implications. At the 90th wealth percentile, slightly
different than the takeaway from the 75th percentile—younger cohorts do look better off. The 90th
percentile point comparisons are also consistent with the idea that rising wealth inequality is more
about what’s happening within the top 10 percent, and less about the 90th percentile relative to
other groups per se, since there are only modest improvements of the comparison cohorts relative
to the reference cohort.
Figure 8 here
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Conclusions
Are the 60-year-olds who were born in 1960 well-prepared for retirement? Are the 50-yearolds born in 1970, and the 40-year-olds born in 1980, on a trajectory to be well prepared when
they retire? Against a backdrop of rising wealth inequality, the concern about some future retirees
seems justified. But how many future retirees will face economic hardships in their retirement
years? How large are the expected shortfalls in terms of wealth needed for a secure retirement?
Researchers with different retirement wealth adequacy yardsticks could look at the same wealth
distributions and come to very different conclusions about the number of people facing retirement
shortfalls, and how large those shortfalls might be.
In this paper, we consider retirement wealth adequacy using relative yardsticks. The
reference points are today’s retirees, the cohort born in the 1930s, the early Boomers born in the
1940s, and the mid-Boomers born in the 1950s, all of whom are at different stages of retirement.
We compare the wealth distributions of younger cohorts at the same ages, and we find support for
the idea that rising wealth inequality in net worth and DB pensions is indeed driving relative wealth
declines (and presumably retirement preparedness) in the bottom half of the distribution.
The relative wealth approach means we cannot say anything about absolute retirement
preparedness for a given individual or a cohort. Yet if we believe that 20 percent of the 1930s
cohort experienced financial hardship in retirement, which seems probable given Brown et al.’s
(2020) analysis of the HRS, then some fraction below 20 percent of the 1940s cohort can be
expected to experience financial hardship in retirement, based on their relative wealth distributions
at age 60. 8 Depending on the wealth concept used, we conclude that somewhere between the 13th
and 18th percentile of the 1940s cohort had as much wealth as the 20th percentile of the 1930s
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cohort at age 60, putting them moderately or significantly ahead of the 1930s cohort depending on
whether social security is considered.
Also, and still depending on the specific wealth measure and the assumption about future
social security benefit cuts, the inferences go in the other direction for younger cohorts, especially
at low wealth levels. Under a payable social security scenario, the 30th percentile of the 1970s
cohort had the same wealth as the 20th percentile of the 1950s cohort at age 40, meaning we could
be looking at a 50 percent increase in the fraction of retirees facing hardship when the 20th
percentile is our cutoff, presuming that the 1950s cohort have a similar rate of hardship in
retirement as did the 1930s cohort. At the bottom of the wealth distribution, relative retirement
preparedness depends on how policymakers address expected future social security shortfalls.
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Endnotes
1

These are analogous to the ‘rank gap’ and ‘level gap’ concepts described in Bayer and Charles

(2018) to discuss the evolution of the racial earnings gap. Our framework is slightly different in
that we are comparing cohorts at different ages (instead of indexing to a calendar year), and we
present the full distribution of relative ranks.
2

This is the opposite presentation of the rank gap as used by Bayer and Charles (2018).

3

A more detailed explanation of the methods used to construct comprehensive household wealth

can be found in Sabelhaus and Volz (2021).
4

See Bhutta et al. (2020) for a discussion of the SCF and the most recent results, the 2019 survey.

5

The demographic variables are available for both the SCF respondent and the spouse/partner,

which is important, because the SCF micro files always assign the male in a couple (person closest
to age 40 in a same sex couple) to be the respondent, and the other individual to be the
spouse/partner, without regard to which is the primary earner.
6

Technically, because the SCF data spans 1989 to 2019, we use the last seven years of each decade

to represent a birth cohort, so the ‘1930s’ means 1930-37 and ‘1970s’ is 1970-77. Birth years
within a given cohort are systematically observed with different frequencies across survey waves
at various ages, so we reweight by birth year within each cohort and age group to keep the cohort
representation constant across the relative comparisons, that is, each birth cohort gets equal weight.
7

There is only minor reranking of individuals when changing from the base wealth distribution to

the comprehensive wealth distribution, as most households expect to receive Social Security
benefits and the level of SSW is highly correlated with base wealth levels. Thus, an individual’s
rank is very similar across Figures 1a and 1b.
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8

Brown et al. (2020) measure hardship of the 1932-37 birth cohort in 2014, when they were ages

77-82. They find that 6.5% of individuals were in poverty while 12.4% had annuitized wealth
below 150% of the poverty line. Since this is a snapshot in time, it is likely that some fraction of
those not currently in hardship experienced some difficulties earlier in retirement.
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1a. Base wealth (net worth plus DB)
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1b. Comprehensive wealth (net worth plus DB and SSW)
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Figure 1. Relative rank distributions at age 60
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
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2a. Net worth plus DB wealth
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2b. Net worth plus DB and SSW
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Figure 2. Relative rank distributions at age 50
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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3a. Base wealth (net worth plus DB)
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3b. Comprehensive wealth (net worth plus DB and SSW)
Reference Cohort Cumulative Distribution
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3c. Net worth plus DB and scheduled and payable SSW

Reference Cohort Cumulative Distribution

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Comparison Cohort Percentile

1950s (Reference)

1960s

1970s

Figure 3. Relative rank distributions at age 40
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4. 10th percentile of cross-cohort wealth distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5. 25th percentile of cross-cohort wealth distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6. 50th percentile of cross-cohort wealth distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7. 75th percentile of cross-cohort wealth distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8. 90th percentile of cross-cohort wealth distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations.

